FMEA NO. W 7.4 CRITICALITY 2/IR		SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT Cable DWG 40. 2293290-501,502 LSSUED 10-14-86 SHEET 1 UF 6
FATEURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAI LURE EFFECT OR END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
oss of +28Y power (RMS) Open/Short to GND	1) No video from wrist camera camera stack 2) No video from elbow camera 3) No elbow PIU control Norst Case: No PIU control of elbow camera which prevents arm stowage.	DESIGN FEATURES The M7 RVS/RMS cable is a 20-inch long assembly, 35-witterminated on each end with a 37-pin connector [P1, K3] wires are shielded #24 Twinax twisted-pair wires. The commands from the RVS to the RMS wrist or elbow camera to the RVS. The cable design is taken from the successfully flown cable-connector assembly in which the wire terminations flexture at the joint between the wire and the connect concentration is moved away from the conductor connect the length of the conductors encapsulated in a potted-also protects the assembly from dirt and entrapped modin space. The cable and its components meet the applicable requisive specifications. These requirements include: • General/Mechanical/Electrical Features • Design and Construction • Materials • Terminal Solderability • Environmental • Qualification • Marking and Serialization • Traceability and Nocumentation	re assembly. The cable is 66014N36SN16). The video and sync W7 cable provides power and stack and returns video signals applied program. The design is a sare protected from excessive or terminal. The load ion and distributed axially along taper profile. This technique sture which could cause problems

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FMEA NO. N 7.4 CRITICALITY 2/18	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	DMG NO. 2293290-501,502 ISSUED 10-14-86 SHEET 2 OF 5
FATLURE MUDE AND	FATLURE EFFECT- ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
ss of +28V pawer (RMS) en/Short to GMD	1) We video from wrist camera camera stack 2) No video from elbow camera 3) No elbow PTU control Morst Case: No PTU control of elbow camera which prevents arm stowage.	QUALIFICATION TEST Qualified by 1.) similarity to previous successful space programs and 2.) by use diqualification tests of CCTY LRUs. ACCEPTANCE TEST The cable acceptance test consists of an ohometer check to assure that each wire connection is present and intact. Results are recorded on data sheets. OPERATIONAL TEST The following tests verify that CCTV components are operable and that the commands the PHS (A7A1) panel switch, through the RCU, through the sync lines to the Camera PHS (A7A1) panel switch, through the RCU, through the sync lines to the Camera to the Camera/PTU command decoder are proper. The tests also verify the camera's ability to produce video, the VSU's ability to route video and the monitor's ability shall be produced video, the VSU's ability to route video and the monitor's ability shall be prevented and the state of the MCM command path. Pre-Launch on Orbiter Test/In-Flight Test 1. Power CCTV System. 2. Select a monitor via the PHS panel, as destination and the camera under test source. 3. Send "Camera Power On" command from PHS panel. 4. Select "External Sync" on amonitor. 5. Observe video displayed on monitor. If video on monitor is synchronized (1 stable raster), then this indicates that the camera is receiving composite syfrom the RCU and that the camera is producing synchronized video. 6. Send Pan, Tilt, Focus, Zoom, ALC, and Gamma commands and visually (either via monitor or direct observation) verify proper operation. 7. Select Dumilink as destination and camera under test as source. 8. Observe video routed to downlink. 9. Send "Gamera Power Off" command via PHS panel. 10. Repeat Steps 3 through 9 except issue commands via the MON command path. The proves that the CCTV equipment is operational if video is satisfactory.	

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FMEA NO. W 7.4 CRETICALITY 2/1R		SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT CABLE DAG NO. 2293290-501,502 TSSUED TD-14-86 SHEET 3 OF 5
FATLURE NODE AND FATLURE EFFECT CAUSE ON END ITEM		RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
FATEURE NODE AND CAUSE DSS of +28V power (RMS) pen/Short to GND	TATLURE EFFECT ON END ITEM 1) No video from wrist camera camera stack 2) No video from elbow camera 3) No elbow PTU control Morst Case: No PTU control of elbow camera which prevents arm stowage.	QA/INSPECTION Procurement Control - Nire, connectors, solder, ethand suppliers which meet the requirements set forth Plan Nork Statement (NS-2593176). Incoming Inspection & Storage - Incoming Quality is materials and parts. Results are recorded by lot control numbers for future reference and traceabil Material Controlled Stores and retained under spec fabrication is required. Non-conforming materials (MRB) disposition. (PAI-307, PAF IQC-53). Assembly & Test - Prior to the start of assembly, by stock room personnel as the items are accumulated again by the operator who assembles the kas-built-parts-list (ABPL). Specific instructions are given in assembly drawing called out in the Fabrication Procedure and Record Process Standard crimping flight connector contact splicing of standard interconnecting wire using Raprocess Standard marking of parts or assemblies wi material and test procedure (TP-AI-2293290). Qualitation of key operations. Preparation for Shipment - When fabrication and tepackaged according to 2280746, Process Standard for All related documentation including assembly drawing gathered and held in a documentation folder assembly. This folder is retained for reference.	c. are procured from approved vendors in the CCTV contract and Quality is in the CCTV contract and Quality is inspections are made on all received and retained in file by drawing and ity. Accepted items are delivered to ified conditions until cable are held for Haterial Review floard all items are verified to be correct ed to form a kit. The items are it by checking against the genotes and applicable documents (FPR-2293290). These are 2280800 - s, 2280801 - Process Standard in-line sychem solder sleeves, 2280876 - th epoxy colors, 2280876. Potting ity and DCAS inspections are performed set is complete, the cable assembly is are Packaging and Handling Guidelines. Ings. Parts List. ABP1. Test Data, etc.
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FREA NO. N 7.4 CRITICALITY 2/1R		SHUTTLE CCTV CRITICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT Cable DING NO. 2293290-501,502 TSSUE0 10-14-86 SHEET 4 OF 5
FATLURE HORE AND FATLURE EFFECT CAUSE ON END ITEM		RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
oss of +28Y power (RMS) pen/Short to GMD	3) No video from wrist camera camera stack 2) No video from elbow camera 3) No elbow PTU control Worst Case: No PTU control of elbow camera which prevents arm stowage.	FAILURE HISTORY There have been no reported failures during RCA	testing, pre-flight or flight.

FNEA NO. <u>N 7.4</u> CRITICALETY <u>2/18</u>		SHUTTLE CCTV CRETICAL ITEMS LIST	UNIT CABLE DWG NO. 2293290-501,502 I \$\$UED
FAICURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE	
.ess of +28V power (RMS) Ipen/Short to GMD	1) No video from wrist camera camera stack 2) No video from elbow camera 3) No elbow PIU control Worst Case: No PIU control of elbow camera which prevents arm stowage.	Loss of ability to position the Elbow camera. Possible thow camera physically interferes with a payload. It payload bay door cannot be closed. Loss of crew and on the CREW ACTIONS Perform EVA to reposition the elbow camera, use RMS majettison the RMS. CREW TRAINING Crew should be trained in contingency EVA and RMS open MISSION CONSTRAINT Bo not manifest Elbow camera for any flight where the interfere with each other (for any pan or tilt angle) not change the camera position until the interfering in	RMS cannot be stowed the part whiche. Ition to reposition the camera, or vations procedures. payload and the elbow camera camera for the camera must be flown do